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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Scott Ashbey entered conditional guilty pleas in each of three cases, reserving his
right to appeal the district court's orders denying his motions to suppress. Mr. Ashbey sought to
suppress evidence discovered as the result of a traffic stop that an officer prolonged to facilitate a
dog sniff, in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court expressly found the
officer had acted as safety backup for the dog handler, instead of pursuing the traffic violation.
However, the district court concluded there was no unlawful prolonging of the stop because the
officers had "information" that Mr. Ashbey might be transacting in narcotics, and alternatively,
because the normal traffic-related tasks could have been completed within the same timeframe as
the dog sniff.
On appeal, Mr. Ashbey argues that district court's rulings are erroneous.

First, the

officers' "information," which the officer attributed to unspecified "street sources," was bare
bones, and according to the holdings in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990), and State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009), lacked the requisite indicia of reliability to meet the Fourth

Amendment's reasonable suspicion standard. Second, the district court's alternative rationale,
that the officers "could have" completed the traffic related tasks within the same timeframe as
dog sniff, was expressly rejected in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and State v.
Linze, 161 Idaho 605 (2016), and therefore cannot justify the officers' conduct. The district

court's orders denying suppression should be reversed, and in accordance with the plea
agreement, Mr. Ashbey should be allowed to withdraw his guilty pleas.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1 On December 21,
2018, Officer Cannon was surveilling an apartment building based on "information" from
unspecified "street sources" that Mr. Ashbey and his roommate had been selling drugs out of the
second floor unit, and allowing other people to use drugs there.

(Tr., p.5, Ls.16-21;

Conf.Exhibits, p.10. )2 Officer Cannon observed two people leave the building and drive off in a
Toyota 4Runner, headed east, and he radioed this information to Officer Nordman. (Tr., p.5,
Ls.16-22; Conf.Exhibits, p.10.) Based on the description of the vehicle and the direction it was
headed, Officer Nordman located the Toyota and followed it until he observed a tum-signal
violation, and then he conducted a traffic stop. (Tr., p.5, L.16 -p.6, L.3.) Upon approaching the
Toyota, Officer Nordman recognized and greeted Mr. Ashbey, sitting in the front passenger seat,
next to a female driver. (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-12.) The State's video shows that Officer Nordman told
the driver he had stopped the vehicle because of the tum-signal violation, and he obtained the
driver's license and vehicle registration documents, and also obtained Mr. Ashbey's I.D. card.
(Ex.A, at 1:00-2:00; see also Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.7, L.8.) After being handed these documents,
Officer Nordman ordered the driver out of the car.

(Ex.A, at 1:00-2:00.) After the driver

stepped out of the Toyota, the Officer Nordman walked her back to the patrol car and then asked
if he could search her person; the woman complied with the officer's request to search, and the

1

Unless otherwise indicated, "Tr." refers to the 141-page electronic file entitled "Transcript,"
filed in Appeal No.47251, which contains the transcripts of the preliminary hearing (Tr., pp.137), the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress (Tr., pp.38-87), the district court oral
ruling on that motion (Tr., pp.88-122), and the change of plea/sentencing hearing (Tr., pp.123141 ). "Conf.Exhibits" refers to the 18-page electronic file entitled "Confidential Exhibits," filed
in Appeal No.47251. References to "Ex.A." are to Officer Nordman's bodycam recording, also
filed in Appeal No.47251.
2
Officer Nordman testified that he and Officer Cannon were assigned to a five-member
"community action team." (Tr., p.38, L.7-14.)
2

officer searched the woman's pants pockets, over the front of her shirt, 3 and inside her boots.
(Ex.A., at 2:00-5:00.) During this time, Officer Bangs arrived at the scene with his drug dog,
Halo, in the patrol car. (Tr., p.97, L.23 - p.98, L.7; p.100, Ls.4-5; Ex.A., at 2:00-5:00.) Officer
Nordman asked Officer Bangs to "go grab Mr. Ashbey." (Ex.A, at 2:30.) Officer Nordman later
testified that it he had ordered both occupants outside their car for officer safety reasons, because
he saw a cylindrical object in the front seat area that could be used as weapon. (Tr., p. 7, Ls.1722.) As requested, Officer Bangs retrieved Mr. Ashbey and escorted him over to the side of the
road where Officer Nordman was standing with the female driver. (Ex.A, at 2:30-5:09.) Officer
Nordman then told Officer Bangs to go get his dog and to conduct an exterior sniff of the
Toyota. (Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00; Tr., p.40, Ls.9-10.) For the next fifty seconds, Officer Nordman
acted "as cover for Officer Bangs as he was running his dog." (Tr., p.40, Ls.9-10, p.98, Ls.1418; Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00.) During this time, Officer Nordman was doing nothing to pursue the
traffic infraction. (See Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00; Tr., p.40, Ls.9-10, p.98, Ls.14-18.)4
Soon after the sniff began, the drug dog alerted.

(Ex.A, at 6:00.) A plastic baggie

containing what appeared to be trace amounts of methamphetamine was discovered and seized
during the ensuing vehicle search. (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-25.) The officers did not arrest Mr. Ashbey
at that time. (Tr., p.56, L.1-3.)

3

There is no record the officer found anything of evidentiary value during this search. (See
generally, Tr.; R.)
4
Officer Nordman explained the purpose of that portion of the detention to Mr. Ashbey and the
driver, as follows:
So right now, we are just going to make sure there is nothing else inside of the
vehicle. The officer is going to use his K-9 partner; if the dog doesn't alert to the
vehicle, then you're on your way. Ifhe does alert, then that warrants [us to do] a
search of the vehicle.
(Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00.)
3

Instead, Officer Nordman later swore out a criminal complaint charging Mr. Ashbey with
possession of a controlled substance, based on the evidence discovered and seized on
December 21, 2018, and requested and obtained a felony arrest warrant. (Appeal No.47251,
R., pp.8-24; Tr., p.56, L.4 -p.57, L.19; Con£Exhibits, pp.2-10.) Based on that arrest warrant, on
February 6, 2019, Mr. Ashbey was stopped, arrested, and taken into custody. (Tr., p.56, L.4 p.57, L.19.)

As a result of this second stop and the ensuing searches, officers discovered

evidence of drug paraphernalia, drug residue, and a credit card that was not his. (Tr., p.59, Ls.28, p.80, Ls.5-15.) Based on the evidence from this second stop, the State filed a second case,
charging Mr. Ashbey with possession of paraphernalia and possession of a controlled substance.
(Appeal No. 47252, R., pp. IO, 69.)
Following his booking and detention on those charges, a search of Mr. Ashbey's
belongings resulting in the discovery of heroin. (Tr., p.82, L.13 - p.83, L.24.) Based on that
evidence, the State filed a third case, charging Mr. Ashbey with possessing a controlled
substance, and introducing major contraband into a correctional facility. (Appeal No. 47523,
R., pp.7, 47-48.)
Mr. Ashbey filed motions to suppress in each of his three cases claiming that the original
traffic stop on December 21, 2018, was unlawfully prolonged, in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 5 (Appeal No. 47251 R., pp.50-58; Appeal No. 47252 R., pp.78-86; Appeal
No. 47253 R., pp.58-69.) In each of his cases, he argued the evidence was derived directly or
indirectly as the result of that Fourth Amendment violation, and that the exclusionary rule
applied to require evidence in all three cases be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the poisonous
5

In his third case, involving the alleged introduction of contraband into the jail, CR28-19-3208,
Mr. Ashbey's motion additionally raised issues regarding unwarned and uncounseled statements
and having those statements suppressed at the jail disciplinary hearing. (Appeal No.47253,
R., pp.65-68.) He does not pursue those particular issues on appeal.
4

tree.

(Appeal No. 47251 R., pp.50-58; Appeal No. 47252 R., pp.78-86; Appeal No. 47253

R., pp.58-69.)
The State filed a memorandum in opposition in each of Mr. Ashbey's three cases. In the
first two cases, the State argued only that the traffic stop on December 21, 2018, was not
unlawfully prolonged, 6 and that even if it was, the evidence should not be suppressed pursuant to
"the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule." (Appeal No. 47251 R., pp.64-68; Appeal
No.47252, R., pp.87-94.) In the third case (alleging introduction of contraband into the jail), the
State made the same assertions, but additionally argued for the application of three additional
exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery
doctrine, and the attenuation doctrine. (Appeal No. 47253, R., pp.76-78.)
The district court denied all three of Mr. Ashby's motions. (Appeal No. 47251 R., p.82;
Appeal No.47252, R., p.122; Appeal No. 47253, R., p.90; Tr., p.89, L.4 - p.116, L.24.) In its
oral ruling from the bench, the district court explained that the basis for suppression in all three
cases "stemm[ed] back to the incidents of December 21." (Tr., p.91, Ls.1-2.) The district court
then concluded, "there was no constitutional violation by Officer Nordman in stopping the
vehicle on December 21, 2018." (Tr., p.105, Ls.10-12.)
Though the district court expressly found that, instead of pursuing the traffic violation
Officer Nordman had acted as a safety backup while Officer Bangs ran his drug dog around the
car (see Tr., p.98, Ls.14-18), the court concluded there was no unlawful prolonging of the stop
because Officer Nordman was also pursuing a drug investigation. (Tr., p.105, L.20 - p.106,
6

In its briefing, the State argued that (1) that the officer was justified in having the occupants
exit the vehicle based on officer safety concerns; (2) the officer was justified in expanding the
scope of the traffic stop into a criminal investigation, based the officer's observation of a
"makeshift weapon" next to an "argumentative and agitated passenger"; and (3) the dog sniff
was permissible because it was conducted "simultaneous to the investigative stop" and did not
prolong the stop. (Appeal No. 47251 R., pp.66-67.)
5

L.12.) Specifically, the district court found that the officers "had a suspicion that these folks
could have been doing drug deals at this building," and that "the officers were there to confirm or
deny [sic] information that the vehicle may have been part of some unlawful drug transaction."
(Tr., p.107, Ls.9-11.)
Alternatively, the district court found that no unlawful prolonging had occurred because
the tasks "normally done" for a traffic stop "could have been done" during the same timeframe
as the dog sniff. (Tr., p.107, L.20-p.108, L.4.)
Based on its ultimate conclusion that there was no unlawful prolonging of the stop on
December 21, 2018, the district court denied Mr. Ashbey's motions to suppress in all three of his
cases. In CR28-l 9-2202 (possession of drugs on December 21, 2018), the court stated only that
it was denying the motion. (Tr., p.108, Ls.16-17.) Regarding the second case, CR28-2019-2258
(possession of paraphernalia, drugs, and the credit card, all found as the result of the arrest
warrant), the district court ruled that it was denying the motion "[b ]ased on the court's finding
that there was no unlawful seizure on December 21." (Tr., p.109, Ls.7-9.)
Turning to the third case, CR28-2019-3208, the district court stated,
it's alleged that that should be suppressed basically because of the allegedly
unlawful arrest in the prior case and the allegedly unlawful search and seizure in
the first case, incident No. 1, which I've already found not to be established. For
those reasons, I will not suppress the evidence in case number CR-2019-3208.
(Tr., p.111, Ls.15-21.) The district court made no alternative findings regarding the application
of any exception to the exclusionary rule. (See generally Tr., p.88, L.1 - p.116, L.20.)
Following the denials of his motions to suppress, Mr. Ashbey and the State entered into a
global plea agreement resolving all three of these cases. (See R., pp.87-88.) According to the
agreement's terms, Mr. Ashbey would plead guilty to charges in each of these three cases, and

6

also in a fourth case 7 that is unrelated to this appeal; in exchange, the State agreed that
Mr. Ashbey's pleas in these three cases would be conditionally entered, pursuant to
I.C.R. 1 l(a)(2), with Mr. Ashbey reserving his right to appeal the denials of his motions to
suppress, and entitling him to withdraw his guilty pleas if he prevails on appeal.

(Appeal

No. 47251 R., pp.87, 94; Appeal No.47252, R., pp.132, 139; Appeal No. 47253, R., pp.100-02.)
Pursuant to the agreement, Mr. Ashbey pled guilty to felony charges in each of these
three cases, as well as in the fourth case (Tr., p.132, L.21 - p.133, L.7), and in these three cases,
he was sentenced to an aggregate term of seven years, with three years fixed (Tr., p.138, L.16 p.139, L.20; see Appeal No. 47251 R., p.89; Appeal No.47252, R., p.134; Appeal No. 47253,
R., p.95).
Mr. Ashbey filed notices of appeal in all three cases, and the appeals are consolidated by
order of this Court.

(Appeal No. 47251 R., p.98; Appeal No.47252, R., p.145; Appeal No.

47253, R., p.106; see Order Consolidating Appeals for All Purposes, dated August 15, 2020.)

7

In the fourth case, CR28-19-10676, the State charged Mr. Ashbey with leaving the scene of an
accident. (See R., p.87.)
7

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ashbey's motions to suppress?

8

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ashbey's Motions To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Officer Nordman did

not violate Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment rights. As explained below, the officer prolonged
the traffic stop beyond its mission, and the officer's bare-bones "information" purportedly
obtained from "street sources" was inadequate to justify his detention.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the

standard of review is bifurcated. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009). In conducting that
review, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, unless the findings are shown
to be clearly erroneous. Id. However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts
surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. State v. Henage, 143
Idaho 655, 658 (2007).

Determinations of reasonable suspicion are questions of law and

reviewed de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 790 (1996); State v. Morgan, 154
Idaho 109, 111 (2013).

C.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That The Officers Did Not Violate Mr. Ashbey's
Fourth Amendment Rights
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV.

The stop of a vehicle by law

enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to which the Fourth Amendment applies.

State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016). Evidence obtained in violation of Fourth Amendment
9

protections is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the suppression of both primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, and evidence later discovered
and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, "fruit of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1963); State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).

Here, all of the evidence seized was derived from the first stop, on December 21, 2018,
and that stop was unlawful because Officer Nordman detoured from the traffic purpose of the
stop and prolonged the stop to conduct a drug dog sniff, without sufficient reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity. The district court's purported justification for the officer's conduct, that
tasks "normally done" for a traffic stop "could have been done" during the same timeframe, is
contrary to the controlling Fourth Amendment precedent. The district court's conclusion that the
stop was justified based on "information" that Mr. Ashbey may be involved in drug activity is
also erroneous because the officer's information was bare bones, lacking any indicia of
reliability, and was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion.

1.

The Officer Prolonged The Stop Beyond Its Traffic Mission, When Instead Of
Pursuing The Traffic Tasks, He Asked The K-9 Officer To Run His Drug Dog
And Acted As Cover For The Dog Sniff

As stated by the United States Supreme Court, "the tolerable duration of police inquiries
in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission' [which is] to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns." Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 353. "On-scene investigation into other crimes, however, detours from that mission. So
too do safety precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours." Id. Thus, while a police
officer is permitted to take certain safety measures "in order to complete his traffic mission
safely," safety precautions taken to facilitate a dog sniff or other on-scene investigations - which
are unrelated to the officer's traffic mission - violate the Fourth Amendment, if doing so

"prolongs- i.e. adds time to the stop," and is not "independently supported by individualized
reasonable suspicion." Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357.
In explaining the holdings of Rodriguez, the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Linze stated:
The stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently pursues the
purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related. However,
should the officer abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that
original reasonable suspicion supporting his actions. Indeed, when an officer
abandons his or her original purpose, the officer has for all intents and purposes
initiated a new seizure with a new purpose; one which requires its own
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. This new seizure cannot piggyback on the reasonableness of the original seizure. In other words, unless some
new reasonable suspicion or probable cause arises to justify the seizure's new
purpose, a seized party's Fourth Amendment rights are violated when the original
purpose of the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls within some
established exception).
161 Idaho at 608.
In addressing a defendant's claim that his detention was unlawfully pro longed, "[t ]he
burden is on the State to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify was sufficiently limited
both in scope, and duration." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (emphasis added);
accord State v. Pannell, 127 Idaho 420, 423 (1995).

In the present case, rather than run a license check in accordance with the mission of the
traffic stop, Office Nordman chose to suspend his pursuit of the traffic violation to act in a safety
role to facilitate a drug dog sniff by providing cover to Officer Bangs. (Tr., p.98, Ls.14-18, p.40,
Ls.9-10; Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00.) As explained by Officer Nordman,
Officer Bangs, while he conducts his exterior sniff, he is going to be
concentrating on the dog's movement .... So for safety, I chose not to retreat
back to my vehicle, access my computer. Instead, I allowed Officer Bangs to
conduct his exterior sniff of the vehicle while I essentially was safety and stood
with both the defendant and the driver.
(Tr., 69, L.20 - p.70. L.5 (emphasis added).)
Based on this testimony, the district court explicitly found that,

11

rather than running the driver's license and other identifying information
regarding the defendant and the driver, he chose to stand and act as cover for
Officer Bangs while he had the canine do the search.
(Tr., p.102, Ls.2-12 (emphasis added).)

While the district court made no specific finding

regarding the length of time taken, the State's undisputed video evidence shows that Officer
Nordman stood by, providing cover for Officer Bangs for approximately 50 seconds, before the
dog alerted. (Ex.A, at 5:09-6:00.)
Under the clear holdings of Rodriguez and Linze, once Officer Nordman suspended his
traffic mission to act as cover for the dog sniff, his actions were no longer justified by the
reasonable suspicion of the traffic violation. Unless justified by other, independent reasonable
suspicion, the officer's prolonging of the traffic stop violated Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment
rights.
2.

The District Court's Alternative Reasoning For Finding No Prolonging Has Been
Explicitly Rejected By The Controlling Authority

The district court provided an alternative, though legally erroneous, rationale for why
there was no unlawful extension of the stop, concluding that,
even if Officer Nordman did all the things that are normally done at a traffic stop,
such as gathering the registration proof calling that information in, and then
taking whatever steps are necessary after that ... the drug dog still had the
opportunity and within the time frames expressed in the video, actually did do the
search. By the time all of that could have been done under most circumstances."
(Tr., p.107, L.20-p.108, L.4.)
However, this reasoning - which hypothecates what the officer could have done rather
than what he actually did - was explicitly addressed and flatly rejected in Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
357 ("The reasonableness of a seizure, however, depends on what the police in fact do .... How
could diligence be gauged other than by noting what the officer actually did and how he did it?),

12

and also in Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-09.

The issue came up again in Linze, and the Idaho

Supreme Court explained:
The parties before this Court have suggested two competing interpretations of the
United States Supreme Court's holding in Rodriguez. The State suggests
that Rodriguez allows a seizing officer to deviate from the purpose of a traffic
stop up until the time at which the stop should have been reasonably completed.
In other words, for each traffic stop there is an objective amount of time within
which that stop should reasonably be completed and any unrelated action taken by
an officer within that amount of time does not violate the seized parties' Fourth
Amendment rights.
Conversely, Mr. Linze reasons that a deviation from the original purpose of a
traffic stop will inevitably lengthen the time needed to complete the original
purpose of the seizure, and, accordingly, will result in a stop that "exceed[ s] the
time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made." Under
Mr. Linze's suggested interpretation, the timing of an officer's departure from the
original purpose of the seizure is irrelevant, it only matters that the officer
departed from that purpose.
We hold that Mr. Linze 's interpretation a/Rodriguez is correct [and] the State's
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the United States Supreme Court's
analysis [in Rodriguez].
Id. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, contrary to the alternative reasoning provided by the district court in this case, it is
irrelevant whether8 Officer Nordman could have accomplished "all of the things normally done
during a traffic stop" during the same "timeframe" as the dog sniff, since that is not what the
officer in this case actually did. What the officer actually did in this case was to detour from his
traffic mission, and instead he suspended the license checks, and for 50 seconds acted act as
cover for the safety of the officer conducting the dog sniff. Under the holdings of Linze and

8

Additionally, the district court's factual finding that the time it would take Officer Nordman to
do "all the normal things done during a traffic stop" is within "the same time frame as in the
video," is not supported substantial evidence in the record as to what the "normal things" are, or
how much time they take to complete, and such finding therefore is clearly erroneous and cannot
be used to support the district court's decision. See Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 814 (1994).
13

Rodriguez, the detour prolonged the stop. Unless the added time is justified by independent
reasonable suspicion, the prolonging violates the Fourth Amendment.
3.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing That Extending The Stop To
Conduct A Dog Sniff Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion, Because The
Information From Unspecified "Street Sources" Was Insufficient To Provide
Reasonable Suspicion To Justify An Investigative Detention

When an officer detours from the traffic safety purpose of a traffic stop to conduct other
investigations concerning possible other crimes, or to facilitate such investigation, for all intents
and purposes abandoning the traffic stop, such other investigation must have its own,
independent reasonable suspicion. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608 (describing Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
357.) Unless justified by sufficient reasonable suspicion to investigate other possible crimes, the
officer's conduct in prolonging the traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575
U.S. at 358; Linze, 161 Idaho at 609.
In this case, the district court offered as additional justification for the extended traffic
stop, that there was no unlawful prolonging "because the officers were there to confirm or deny
information that the vehicle may have been part of some unlawful drug transaction." (Tr., p.107,
Ls.4-11.) However, the brief investigative detention that is authorized by Terry v. Ohio, must be
supported by sufficient facts to give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.
392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); see also Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396 (2014); State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009). Absent a reasonable suspicion, prolonging the detention
violates the Fourth Amendment. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-09.
"The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify such a stop 'is dependent upon both the
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability." Navarette, 572 U.S. at
396 (quotations omitted); see also Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811 (stating that, regarding an
informant's tip, "reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances including the
14

substance, source, and reliability of the information provided.") Reasonable suspicion may be
based on the officer's personal observations, but also on information supplied by another person.

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. However, such information must bear
sufficient indicia ofreliability. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811. An officer
may also rely solely on the report of another officer or law enforcement agency, but only so long
as the person making such underlying report possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion.

United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); State v. Van Dorn, 139 Idaho 961, 963-64
(Ct. App. 2004).
In State v. Bishop, the Idaho Supreme Court set forth eight factors gleaned from the
controlling authorities which are "indicative of reliability," and which guide the reviewing court
in assessing the reliability of third-party information provided to an officer; specifically,
[1] whether the informant reveals his or her identity and [2] the basis of his or her
knowledge, [3] whether the location of the informant is known, [4] whether the
information was based on first-hand observations of events as they were
occurring, [5] whether the information the informant provided was subject to
immediate confirmation or corroboration by police, [6] whether the informant has
previously provided reliable information, [7] whether the informant provides
predictive information, and [8] whether the informant could be held criminally
liable if the report were discovered to be false.
146 Idaho 804, 812 (2009) (internal citations omitted).

Not one of these factors exist m

Mr. Ashbey's case.
Indeed, this case resembles the facts of Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), where the
United States Supreme Court held that the information provided to police did not have the
requisite indicia of reliability to support a reasonable suspicion.

There, officers received

information advising that a young black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying
a gun. Id.

The identity of the informant was not disclosed and apparently unknown to the

police. J.L., 529 U.S. at 269. The Court held that, because the informant did not explain how he
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knew about the gun, nor suggest he had any special familiarity with the young man's affairs, the
police had no adequate basis for believing that the informant had knowledge of concealed
criminal activity. Id. Later, in Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. at 398, the Court described
such information, which included no predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to
assess the informant's reliability, as a "bare-bones" tip that did not provide reasonable suspicion
and therefore did not justify an investigative stop.
In Navarette, the Court said its decisions in J.L. and in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325
(1990), provided ''useful guides" in determining whether information received from unidentified
persons provided sufficiently reliable information. 572 U.S. at 398. In White, the informant told
the police that a woman would drive from a particular apartment building, to a particular motel,
in a particular car, and also that the woman would be transporting cocaine. 496 U.S., at 327.
After confirming the innocent details - i.e., the predicted behavior of the woman - the officer
stopped the car as it neared the motel and found cocaine in the vehicle. Id., at 331. The Court
reasoned that by accurately predicting future behavior, the informant demonstrated "a special
familiarity with respondent's affairs," which in tum implied that the informant had "access to
reliable information about that individual's illegal activities." Id., at 332. The Court recognized
that an informant who has proven to tell the truth about some things is more likely to tell the
truth about other things, "including the claim that the object of the tip is engaged in criminal
activity." Id., at 331. The Court noted that White had presented a "close case," and that the
information was ultimately found credible because the informant provided predictive information
which the officers had been able to corroborate. 572 U.S. at 398. The Navarette Court noted
that reliability may also be gleaned where an informant is claiming eyewitness knowledge,
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making a contemporaneous report, or using a traceable method of reporting. 572 U.S. at 398.
However, no such factors are present in Mr. Ashbey's case.
Unlike in White, the information provided in this case by unspecified "street sources"
includes no description of predictive behavior. There is no indication the officers were informed
as to whether or when any suspects would be leaving the apartment, what they might be wearing,
what car, if any, they would be driving, or in what direction they would be headed.

(See

generally Tr.; R.) Unlike in Navarette, there is no indication that the "street sources" claimed to

have first-hand knowledge, had made a contemporaneous report, or used a traceable method of
reporting.

Rather, the "street sources" provided the officers with bare-bones information,

lacking any of the requisite indicia ofreliability. Just like in J.L., such information did not rise to
the level of reasonable suspicion to support an investigative detention ofMr. Ashbey.
Officer Nordman testified he had reasonable suspicion "based on the fact that an
undercover police officer was watching a known narcotics location, witness[ ed] two persons
leave the suspected narcotics location, and those same two persons entered the vehicle which I
had stopped." (Tr., p.64, Ls.11-22.) When asked to provide the specific factual basis for the
underlying drug investigation, Officer Nordman answered only that it was based on "street
sources" which had advised us "that persons were selling narcotics from the location that were
watching."

(Tr., p.76, L.23 - p.77, L.7.)

Similarly, Officer Nordman's Incident Report

identified that factual basis for the suspected criminal activity as follows:
Information gathered from street sources is apartment #3, which is located on the
second level, east end of the building is a known narcotics location. Robert
Ashbey and William Mulkin are said to be selling narcotics out of apartment #3
and allowing narcotic[s] users to use while inside the apartment.
(Confidential Exhibits, p.10 (emphasis added).)
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Nowhere in the record is there any explanation as to what the officer meant by "street
sources." (See generally Tr., R.) The officer did not provide a definition for that term, nor can
its meaning be derived from the evidence in record. The record does not indicate whether such
"street sources" are simply the hunch or hunches of other officers, or a tip or tips provided by a
citizen, and if so, whether the identity of tipster was known or knowable to the officer, or was
been proven reliable in the past. (See generally Tr., R.) A "known" informant is one "whose
reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if his or her allegations tum out to be
fabricated." J.L., 529 U.S. at 269; accord State v. Van Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 965 (Ct. App.
2004) ("A known citizen is one who provides facts from which his or her identity can be readily
ascertained"). Even an anonymous caller who uses the "911" - which has some features that
allow for identify and tracing callers - can be a factor justifying reliance. See Naverette, 572
U.S. at 400-02. Officer Nordman stated only that the information came from unidentified "street
sources." (See generally Tr., R.) Thus, like in J.L., and unlike in Navarette, there is no basis for
this Court to find that the "street sources" were other than unknown, or unknowable informants.
Likewise, the record is devoid of evidence that shows the purported street sources' basis
of knowledge. There is no indication whether they were personally acquainted with Mr. Ashbey
or his roommate or had ever stepped foot inside of their apartment. (See generally Tr.; R.) Nor
is there anything within the information that shows the street sources' information was based on
first-hand observations of events as they were occurring. (See generally Tr.; R.)
Therefore, because reasonable suspicion was absent, Officer Nordman's extension of the
traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation violated Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment rights.
Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-09. The district court's contrary conclusion was error as a matter of law.

18

D.

Mr. Ashbey Is Entitled To Withdraw His Conditional Guilty Pleas In All Three Of His
Cases, Pursuant To The Terms Of His Plea Agreement
Because in all three of these cases, the district court based its denial of the motion to

suppress on its erroneous conclusion that the stop was not unlawfully prolonged (see Tr., p.108,
Ls.16-17, p.109, Ls.7-9, p.111, Ls.15-21), this Court should vacate Mr. Ashbey's convictions in
all three cases, and remand them to the district court for further proceeding, in accordance with
the terms of the plea agreements and the requirements ofldaho Criminal Rule 1 l(a)(2).

CONCLUSION
The district court erred in failing to conclude that the stop was unlawfully prolonged, in
violation of Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment rights. This Court therefore should reverse the
district court's order denying Mr. Ashbey's motions to suppress in these three cases, vacate his
judgments of conviction, and remand his cases to the district court for further proceedings,
consistent with the terms ofhis plea agreements.
DATED this 20 th day of May, 2020.
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